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In October of 2016, a Gallup poll reported that Congress had an approval rating 
of 18%.1 Compared to the President’s approval rating, Congress is seen as ineffective 
and too bipartisan for many Americans. While there has always been a natural tension 
between the opposing parties, it has magnified within recent years. Within Congress 
itself, many members are seeing their political opposition even more unfavorably 
today than their counterparts did two decades ago. Carol Doherty of the Pew 
Research Center claims that it is the “intensity of negativity that’s increased.”2 The 
2008 election marked a new era as President Barrack Obama was elected with his 
encouraging bipartisan, post-racial words that would point to greater cooperation in 
Congress. Much of the legislation, however, during the 111th Congress was passed on 
straight party-line votes. The signature piece of legislation during this congressional 
term, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, passed with all 218 Republicans 
in Congress voting against it. To get the legislation passed, Congressional leaders 
exhausted every trick in the book to force fence-sitting Democrats to vote for it, in 
many cases going against the ideological leanings of their constituencies. 
Consequently, many of them lost re-election. The Affordable Care Act offered few 
compromises for moderate Democrats, much less the Republicans. These actions sent 
shockwaves throughout the electorate, causing major shifts in the composition of 
Congress in both the 2010 and 2012 elections. Angered by being shutout of the 
                                                      
1 Justin McCarthy, “Ahead of Elections, U.S. Congress Approval at 18%,” Gallup, Inc., Oct. 12, 
2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/196268/ahead-elections-congress-approval.aspx?version=print. 
2 Niraj Chokshi, “U.S. Partisanship Is Highest in Decades, Pew Study Finds,” The New York 
Times (New York, NY), June 23, 2016. 
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process, many Republicans would treat their Democratic colleagues in kind. Very 
little significant legislation has been enacted into law since the 111th Congress, and 
even fewer pieces have passed with major bipartisan support. Since a unified, single-
party, filibuster-proof government is unlikely and short-lived if it occurs, cooperation 
on both sides of the aisle will be necessary for any significant achievements to occur. 
The nature of the partisan passage of the Affordable Care Act is unlike the passage of 
similar major pieces of legislation, such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Social 
Securities Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, all of which were passed with broad 
bipartisan support. 
I argue that the decline in bipartisanship was caused by the polarization of the 
voting population, which was prompted by the rise of partisans in elected office. In 
the voting public, partisanship has increased, even as political party identification is 
declining. Party leaders, both elected and un-elected, have helped to shift the focus of 
the news media and elections to the uniform political ideologies of their respective 
parties. The current, un-apathetic American voting population were attracted to these 
shifts and became aligned with one of the ideologies themselves. It is the case that 
parties started to put the focus on ideologies, but they only fully shifted to this focus 
because the public became engaged. Thus, a shift in the current bipartisan landscape, 
will not only need to occur in Congress itself, but also in the understanding and 
perception of the American public. Congress will only change if they do not fear their 
constituents turning on them and voting them out of office. It may be impossible to 
return to the bipartisan days of the past, but an effort can and should be made to create 
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more cooperation in the legislative and most responsive branch of the federal 
government. As this paper, will show, there are meaningful ways in which Congress 




There are currently, two dominant scholarly positions for explaining the 
apparent decline in bipartisanship in the United States Congress. The first camp 
argues that Congress reflects the engaged public, and as the public has become more 
polarized, so too has Congress’ members. Consequently, the decline in bipartisanship 
occurred due to the ideological realignment of the parties.3 Six or seven decades ago, 
party identification weakly correlated with the ideological conscious of the voter. No 
longer are the parties dependent on the support of large voting blocs, such as the 
Democratic reliance on “white voters in the South and white Catholics and working-
class voters in the North.”4 Now, these parties are dependent on the ideological beliefs 
of their supporters, rather than the traditional regional, racial or religious blocs, with 
an important exception being the reliably Democratic bloc of African Americans.5 The 
elites of the parties became more partisan and their leadership lead to more polarized 
parties. Ergo, the engaged electorate began to grow and become more concerned with 
the new partisan nature of these elites. Modern data shows that “the more interested, 
informed, and politically active Americans were, the more likely they were to take 
consistently liberal or consistently conservative positions.”6 As the process became 
more open, the electorate itself became more partisan. 
                                                      
3 Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American 
Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 65.  
4 Ibid., 65. 
5 Ibid., 75. 
6 Ibid., 41. 
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Campaigns are now fought on the ability of the parties to mobilize their key 
voters, which are ideologically centered with their party.7 Voting once was a civic 
duty, but today voters are motivated by partisanship and their longing for their 
ideological centered partisan to be elected. Consequently, a candidate’s ideological 
purity is what now attracts voters to the voting booth. At first glance, the rise of 
partisans as elected officials might be the reason for the lack of bipartisanship in 
Congress, but it is more likely that “few members of Congress are willing to risk 
offending their most active and knowledgeable supporters by being seen consorting 
with the enemy.”8 As is the goal of most elected officials, congressional 
representatives will do what they must to remain in office. 
A second argument made for the decline of bipartisanship is that the 
candidates themselves have become more partisan, but the general public as a whole 
is aligned with the center. Whereas it was once believed that political parties needed 
to nominate a candidate who was a moderate and would appeal to centrists and 
independents, they now nominate highly partisan candidates because there is “more 
enthusiastic support of partisans for their own candidates coupled with more intense 
opposition to the other party’s candidates, and lower turnout among moderates.”9 
This camp cautions from arguing that the electorate itself was becoming more 
partisan, as studies have shown that on major issues, the participants are not as 
polarized on issues as their representatives.10  
                                                      
7 Abromwitz, The Disappearing Center, 84. 
8 Ibid., 169. 
9 Morris P. Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (Boston: Longman, 2011), 29. 
10 Ibid., 76. 
 7 
After changes that resulted in a more seemingly open political process, 
participation by the public became more available. Perhaps unknowingly, these 
actions would also open the door for more partisanship as “the people who 
participate are for the most part those who care intensely about some issue or some 
complex of issues.”11 Their preferred candidates, and often the ones who win, are ones 
that will not compromise on these issues. This lack of compromise, coupled with the 
partisan nature, decreases the chances for bipartisanship. It is the parties themselves, 
however, who control the extent of the partisanship of their candidates that they 
nominate. Ultimately, the voting public “can only choose between the alternatives 
offered by the parties.”12 
There is a third, and less widespread argument that postulates that the polarity 
within Congress is caused by the change in the structure of Congress itself. This camp 
argues that the leaders of the Congressional party, often the majority “use and exploit 
the rules and norms of the body to ramrod through legislation regularly on party-line 
votes.”13 Another factor is the alignment of the President with Congress. When the 
majority in both branches became the same, it “crystallized the minority and 
sharpened the partisan conflict,” which caused the Congressional parties to “become 
more unified and ideologically polarized.”14 While the decrease in bipartisanship was 
                                                      
11 Fiorina, Culture War?, 199. 
12 Ibid., 267. 
13 Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing 
America and How to Get It Back on Track (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 140. 
14 Ibid., 211. 
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ultimately caused by the entire membership of Congress, the members were guided 




To demonstrate the decline of bipartisanship in Congress, I will trace the 
change in the partisan nature of Congress during three distinct time periods. As my 
methodology, I will look at case studies of the passage of prominent and signature 
legislation during each of the three time periods.  These time periods include the early 
20th century, the New Deal era, and the civil rights era. In each of the case studies, I 
will examine the actions and views of congressional leadership, as well as the 
composition of the final votes for each piece of legislation. I will then compare the 
actions of Congress to polling data taken about that a particular piece of legislation. I 
hope to show through this that party leadership forced Congress’ action, which 
caused a shift in the opinion of the public, thus changing the partisanship of Congress. 
The first era is that of the 51st Congress and in particular the passage of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act represents a significant 
piece of legislation, that was passed by a near unanimous majority. This period will 
be vital in demonstrating the behavior of Congress before a strong sense of ideological 
partisanship was introduced into the political parties. 
The second period that will be analyzed is that of the Second New Deal, which 
will involve the 74th Congress. In particular, the piece of legislation that is the most 
significant is the Social Security Act. Because the New Deal is not defined by one piece 
of legislation, secondary legislation will be considered. This legislation includes the 
National Labor Relations Act and the Neutrality Act. When looking at this time 
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period, it will also be important to discuss Roosevelt’s purge of the Democratic Party 
and its impact on the voting population. 
The third period is that of the passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964, which 
occurred during the 88th Congress. It will be important here to look at the broad 
bipartisan support that this legislation received, and how it might have further 
deteriorated group politics. Democratic leaders had to maneuver around Southern 
Democrats, who found it difficult to reconcile their political ideologies with their 
commitment to their party identity. 
  
 11 
Chapter One: Standing Up to the Giants 
Shortly before the turn of the century, large corporations known as monopolies 
dominated the United States’ industrial market. Monopolies had exclusive access to 
or supply of a good or service. These monopolies could control the marketplace 
because they had virtually no competition. This lack of competition flies in the face of 
free market principles, which the United States attempts to adhere to. This lack of 
competition also gives the corporation the ability to set their prices. If prices rise 
dramatically, the result can be burdensome on consumers. A form of monopoly, the 
trust, proved to be very effective at limiting competition while maintaining separate 
autonomous companies. The Sherman Antitrust Act, or just put the Sherman Act, was 
a bill designed to impose penalties on new enterprises that would try to create trusts. 
The passage of this act will prove that the 51st Congress was able to pass legislation in 
a bipartisan manner because of the low levels of ideological differences within 
Congress itself. 
By the late 1800’s many industries were controlled by a single trust. These 
trusts included the Standard Oil Trust, Sugar Trust, School Slate Trust, Envelope 
Trust, and even the Paper Bag Trust.15 Trusts were considered evil creations that were 
the cause for much of the economic and social suffering of average Americans. By the 
end of the 1880’s, the public opinion of trusts was uniformly negative. One member 
of the public said that the trusts were “merciless and cruel exploiters, completely 
                                                      
15 Charles S. Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman 
Act’s State Statutory Forerunners,” The Yale Law Journal  125, no. 4 (2016): 1081. 
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selfish, living by no rules and guided by no ethics.”16 In essence, the public hated 
trusts. 
A few years before the creation of the Sherman Act, opposition to trusts was 
present on both sides of the political spectrum. In his speech to Congress in 1987, 
President Grover Cleveland would proclaim: 
“In speaking of the increased cost to the consumer of our home 
manufactures, resulting from a duty laid upon imported articles of the 
same description, the fact is not overlooked that competition among our 
domestic producers sometimes has the effect of keeping the price of 
their products below the highest limit allowed by such duty. But it is 
notorious that this competition is too often strangled by combinations 
quite prevalent at this time, and frequently called trusts, which have as 
their object the regulation of the supply and price of commodities made 
and sold by members of the combination. The people can hardly hope 
for any consideration in the operation of these selfish trusts.”17 
 
At this point during the discussions, Democrats like Cleveland were pushing towards 
removing tariffs on foreign corporations, to increase competition and thus reduce the 
possibility of monopolies.18 Likewise, Republicans were also discussing the issue. 
Republican Congressman William McKinley would share a similar sentiment at the 
1888 Republican Convention, where he said, 
“we are uncompromising in favor of the American system of 
protection.... [T]he Republican party would effect all needed reduction 
of the national revenue by repealing the taxes upon tobacco and 
spirits.... If there should still remain a larger revenue that is requisite for 
the wants of the government we favor the entire repeal of internal taxes 
rather than the surrender of any part of our protective system at the joint 
behest of the whisky Trust and the agents of foreign manufacturers.... 
We declare our opposition to all combinations of capital organized in 
Trusts or otherwise to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among 
                                                      
16 Will Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A. J. 160, (1961). 
17 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887. 
18 Peter R. Dickson and Philippa K. Wells, “The Dubious Origins of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act: The Mouse That Roared,” Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 20, no. 1 (2001): 7. 
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our citizens and we recommend to Congress and the state legislatures 
... such legislation as will prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress 
the people by undue charges ... or by unjust rates.”19 
 
Whereas the Democratic strategy was to reduce the tariffs, Republicans sought to 
protect tariffs and look for other ways by which they could attack the trusts. Further 
complicating things, many of the generous donors and supporters of the Republican 
party were the owners of trusts themselves. For example, during the 1888 Republican 
Convention where there was an anti-trust sentiment being populated, the head of the 
Republican party, George Blaine, was absent as he was attending a gathering hosted 
by Andrew Carnegie, one of America’s most famous trust leaders.20 One of his 
companies, the Carnegie Steel Company could control the price of steel by dominating 
the industry market. 
 As is often the case, state legislatures were the first to respond through 
legislation to the widespread public hatred of trusts. In 1888, Iowa became the first 
state to pass anti-trust legislation with their “Act for the Punishment of Pools, Trusts 
and Conspiracies”. Iowa’s law said that any corporation in Iowa that created a trust 
or similar agreement “to fix prices or limit output of certain commodities, such as coal, 
lumber, or oil, was guilty of a conspiracy to defraud,” and could be punished in either 
criminal or civil court.21 Shortly after the adoption of Iowa’s antitrust law, sixteen 
additional states passed similar legislation.22 It is important to note that the political 
                                                      
19 New York Times, June 22, 1888, p.1. 
20 Peter Dickson, “The Dubious Origins,” 7. 
21 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, State Antitrust Practice and Statutes (4th Ed. 2009), 
Iowa 18-2. 
22 Charles Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation,” 1081. 
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party makeup of these states varied, causing the legislation to be passed on strong 
bipartisan grounds. 
 The public support for legislation to halt the formation of trusts was becoming 
so widespread that federal lawmakers could no longer ignore it. In the late summer 
of 1888, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, who had failed to obtained the Republican 
nomination for President only a month before, introduced a resolution which directed 
all efforts to combat trusts to the Senate Finance Committee.23 His resolution, went as 
far as to give the Finance Committee jurisdiction over any proposed legislation that 
dealt with trusts. Some have argued that Sherman’s resolution merely served as a 
smokescreen to appease the anti-trust voters of the 1888 election, while others claim 
that it was a direct attack against trusts as called for by the newly established 
Republican platform.24 Regardless of the motivation behind the resolution, neither 
Sherman or the Republicans in Congress produced antitrust legislation in the 
following months.  
The first piece of antitrust legislation was instead proposed by Democratic 
Texas Senator John Reagan on August 14, 1888.25 Senator Reagan’s bill would charge 
any group of people with a high misdemeanor who joined, 
“First. To create or carry out restrictions in trade. Second. To limit, to 
reduce, or to increase the production or prices of merchandise or 
commodities. Third. To prevent competition in the manufacture, 
making, sale, or purchase of merchandise or commodities. Fourth. To 
create a monopoly.”26 
 
                                                      
23 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1888. 
24 Peter Dickson, “The Dubious Origins,” 8. 
25 Charles Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation,” 1083. 
26 S. 3440, 50th Cong. § 1 (1888) 
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Senator Reagan and the Democrats attempted to get this legislation passed through 
the more-neutral Judiciary Committee, but Senator Sherman could route it through 
the Finance Committee because of his resolution. Very quickly after taking up 
Reagan’s bill in the Finance Committee, Sherman introduced his legislation targeting 
trusts. The fundamental difference in Sherman’s bill was that he did not make the 
creation of trusts a crime, rather his bill would nullify the charter of any corporation 
found in violation of the antitrust laws.27 Possibly because of the Republican party’s 
reliance on trust-friendly donors, Sherman’s proposed bill was much easier on the 
trusts and has been described by some to be “a little amateurish.”28 The Senate Finance 
Committee produced a final bill that included Sherman’s description of a trust, while 
at the same time using Reagan’s punishment for the practice of building a trust. The 
Committee bill was a true compromise in which both sides won and lost. 
Even though the Committee reported the legislation to the full Senate in 
September of 1888, no action occurred before the close of legislative business in March 
of 1889.  In December of that year, President Benjamin Harrison gave his State of the 
Union speech in which he argued that trusts “when organized, as they often are, to 
crush out all healthy competition and to monopolize the production or sale of an 
article of commerce and general necessity, they are dangerous conspiracies ... and 
should be made the subject of prohibitory and even penal legislation.”29 Harrison’s 
speech served as a call for action in the Senate. 
                                                      
27 S. 3445, 50th Cong. (as introduced by Senator Sherman, Aug. 14, 1888). 
28 THORELLI, supra note 48, at 170. 
29 U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 51st Congr., 1st sess., 1889. 
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In February of 1890, Representative William McKinley proposed a bill to the 
House Ways and Means Committee that would curb trusts through tariffs. 
Subsequently, Sherman’s antitrust bill was brought back to the attention of Congress, 
as was Reagan’s and a bill by Democratic Senator James George which included 
language exempting the farm industry. Because the Senate could not agree to any one 
of the three bills, they crafted a compromise bill that included “Sherman’s provisions 
for civil liability, adopted Reagan’s definition of ‘trust’… and his provisions for 
criminal antitrust liability, and incorporated George’s proviso shielding farmers and 
laborers from liability.”30 
 Republican Chairman George Edmonds of Vermont led an effort to strip the 
bill to its bare bones, when the compromise bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.31 The final bill contained only a combination of the provisions of both 
Senators Sherman and Reagan’s original bills. Senator Edmond aimed to simplify the 
legislation and to make it as uncontroversial as possible.32 The Edmonds bill was 
approved by both chambers of Congress and went to a conference committee in May 
of 1890. For many in the Senate, the disagreements of the antitrust legislation centered 
around where Congress would get the authority to enforce the law, and what the 
proper penalty should be.33 Senators Sherman, Reagan, and George each offered a 
                                                      
30 Charles Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation,” 1087. 
31 Ibid.,  1088. 
32 William L. Letwin, “Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890,” The University of 
Chicago Law Review 23 (1956): 257. 
33 Charles Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation,” 1090. 
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different constitutional provision in their arguments, which would satisfy most every 
member of Congress. 
The controversial and debated question then became what the penalty for 
engaging in a trust should be. After a much-heated debate, it was determined to look 
to the states and compliment their already established antitrust legislation. When 
reporting the bill for final consideration, the conference committee even said that 
“whatever legislation Congress may enact on this subject, within the limits of its 
authority, will prove of little value unless the States shall supplement it by such 
auxiliary and proper legislation as may be within their legislative authority”.34 The 
idea of looking to the states was palatable to both sides of the isle. In June of 1890, the 
conference bill was passed unanimously in the House of Representatives and by a 
margin of fifty-one to one in the Senate. President Benjamin Harrison signed the 
Sherman Antitrust Act into law on July 2, 1890. 
The final form of the Sherman Act was very different from the bills proposed 
by Senators Sherman and Regan in late-1888. The first lines of the Sherman Act declare 
that “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal.”35 This declaration is a clear compromise between the 
definition of a trust in Senator Sherman’s bill and the penalty for forming one from 
Senator Reagan’s bill. The bill goes as far as to assess monetary fines to persons found 
guilty of creating trusts, reading that they “shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 
                                                      
34 H.R.REP.NO.51-1707,at1(1890) 
35 The Sherman Antitrust Act, U.S. Code 15 (1890), §§1 et seq. 
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five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the courts.”36 The Sherman Act appeased the public 
hatred of trusts by effectively ending trusts. 
Before the passage of the Sherman Act, it was a widely shared idea that the 
public hated trusts very fervently.37 Even defenders of trusts recognized that the 
public opinion was against them saying that “the public mind has begun to assume a 
state of apprehension, almost amounting to alarm.”38 An antitrust sentiment was 
being spread though all corners of society, including journalism where papers like the 
New York Times aired antitrust opinions often.39 This public opinion is what prompted 
both the Republicans and Democrats to focus on antitrust policy in the conventions 
and elections of 1888. Some might argue that “any law might be acceptable if it really 
suppressed the worst abuses of the trusts, especially those like the Standard Oil, 
Sugar, and Whisky Trusts.”40 Because the Sherman Act promised to do just that, many 
in the public were satisfied at the passage of the legislation. Immediately following 
the passage of the Sherman Act, the New York Times remained very supportive of the 
actions taken to curb trusts; however, that support would waiver in the following 
years.41 
                                                      
36 The Sherman Antitrust Act, U.S. Code 15. 
37 William Letwin, “Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law,” 223. 
38 George Gunton, “The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts,” Political Science Quarterly 3, 
no. 3, (1888). 
39 William Letwin, “Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law,” 223. 
40 Ibid., 235. 
41 Robert L. Bradley, Jr., “On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act,” Cato Journal 9, no. 3, 
(2001): 741. 
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Throughout history, scholars have argued about the effectiveness of the 
Sherman Act. One scholar writes that “the Sherman Act’s capacious language helps 
explain the pinball-like trajectory of American antitrust law over its long life, a life 
that has seen various governing principles come and go like so many changes in 
political fashion.”42 Some have gone as far to say that any better law would have 
required that “congressmen would have had to be much more adept, much more 
remote from public opinion, and much more unanimous in their own views, than the 
lawmakers of a democracy ever can be.“43 
One of the best indicators of how legislation withstands time is how the 
Supreme Court has upheld it in its decisions. The first case related to the Sherman Act 
to be argued before the Supreme Court was United States v. E.C. Knight Company in 
1895, in which Chief Justice Fuller argued that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was 
constitutional, it just did not apply to manufacturing.44 The Court would not uphold 
the actual dismantling of a trust until Northern Securities Company v. United States, in 
which they allowed the federal government to break up the Northern Securities 
Company’s railroad monopoly.45 Finally, in 1911, Chief Justice White argued for the 
majority in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States that one of the most 
infamous trusts in the United States had to dismantle because it was an unreasonable 
combination of companies.46 The Sherman Act has demonstrated that it could 
                                                      
42 Charles Dameron, “Present at Antitrust’s Creation,” 1114. 
43 William Letwin, “Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law,” 222. 
44 United States v. E.C. Knight Company, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
45 Northern Securities Company, et al., Appts. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
46 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United State, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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withstand the test of time. Within a couple decades it could accomplish what it was 
designed to do, with the help of additional legislation. The Sherman Act served as the 
foundation for Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt’s aggressive ‘trust-busting’ 
agenda. 
Finance Committee Chairman Edmonds exerted a lot of power over the 
passage of the Sherman Act. Edmonds rightfully recognized that stripping the bill to 
its bare bones would make it more palatable for a clear majority of Congress.  His 
actions underscore the power of committee chairmen in Congress at the turn of the 
century. The power of committee chairs is present because they “are advantageously 
positioned to form ideas into law,” because they have “control over the agenda, 
communications, and financial resources of the committee.”47 The role of committees 
in the legislative process gives committees power and “chairmen of major committees 
frequently used this power capriciously and arbitrarily to frustrate their opponents.”48  
Chairmen often used these powers to shape the ideological features of legislation, like 
is the case with the Sherman Act. 
The Sherman Antitrust Act passed with overwhelmingly bipartisan margins in 
both chambers of Congress. It serves as an example of how public opinion can cause 
both sides of the political spectrum to respond to a controversy. While it could be 
debated about the motives of Republicans for pursuing antitrust legislation, having 
been bankrolled by many proponents of trusts, the fact remains that they did respond 
                                                      
47 Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek, Frances E. Lee and Eric Schickler. Congress and It’s 
Members (Los Angels: CQ Press, 2014), 184. 
48 U.S. Senate, “Senate Committees,” Senate History, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm. 
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to the controversy in a way that would appease the public. The almost unanimous 
support for the bill can be contributed to Senate Finance Chairmen Edmonds and his 
decision to offer a bill that was palatable to everyone. The question then becomes, 
whether or not other bills could pass with such bipartisan support. 
  
 22 
Chapter Two: Recovery in the Face of Defeat 
On a fall day in late 1929, the unthinkable happened. The United States stock 
market crashed, sending the country into years of economic and social peril. During 
this time, many average Americans could not afford the necessities of food and 
shelter. The country needed change, and the citizenry was hoping to get that change 
when Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President and assumed the office in March 
of 1933. Roosevelt’s administration set out to pass legislation and enact executive 
action aimed at alleviating some of the everyday American’s economic suffering. 
These measures and new laws would eventually be known as the New Deal. 
Roosevelt knew that his administration was going to be judged by his first one 
hundred days in office and so there was an urgency to get things done. At the same 
time, he understood that he could do nothing without Congress. One of Roosevelt’s 
top priorities was to get Americans back to work, therefore he guided the 
development and passage of the National Industry Recovery Act through Congress. 
Its passage demonstrates the bipartisanship in Congress during the New Deal era, as 
well as the role of the President in bringing Congress together. 
Even before Roosevelt’s administration began to put a focus on the industrial 
workforce, there was always a background understanding of the importance of such 
activities. Cabell Phillips notes in From the Crash to the Blitz, that “at all events, there 
was a considerable historical and intellectual background for the idea of corralling the 
business and industrial resources of the nation into a more disciplined force, subduing 
their anarchic tendencies, and infusing them with a minimal sense of social 
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responsibility.”49 For decades, Americans had focused on legislation aimed at 
allowing easier creation of new business and industry. The Great Depression, 
however, marked a time where business slowed. It is estimated that business activity 
was only at half of what it had been in previous years.50 
 It was clear that some type of legislation needed to be created, but there was 
disagreement about what type. Hugh Johnson, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce John Dickinson, Chamber of Commerce executive 
Henry Herriman, and Democratic Senator Robert Wagner each had their own plan 
for boosting businesses and industry. The country needed a uniformed planned, 
however, so President Roosevelt brought these individuals together and “locked them 
in a room” to try and coerce a comprehensive plan from them.51 They produced a 
piece of legislation for Roosevelt’s approval, which was then sent to Congress. In a 
directive to Congress, President Roosevelt said, “my first request is that the Congress 
provide for the machinery necessary for a great cooperative movement throughout 
all industry in order to obtain wide reemployment, to shorten the working week, to 
pay a decent wage for the shorter week and to prevent unfair competition and 
disastrous overproduction.”52 For Roosevelt, Congress’ priority should be on 
stimulating job growth and getting Americans back to work. 
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In Congress, opposition to the bill came from two fronts. The first was from the 
original progressives, amongst whom Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler and 
Republican Senator William Borah were the most vocal. They argued that the law 
would see “the weakening of the antitrust laws by permitting collusive action through 
trade associations.”53 Senator Borah in particular would argue that “the suspension of 
the antitrust acts would infallibly promote the concentration of wealth and power.”54 
Senator Wagner, one of the bill’s original authors rebutted these sentiments by saying 
that the purpose of the bill was “to make sure the best judgment and the highest ideals 
of the industry govern its competitive activities, replacing the now low standard of 
sweatshop, cutthroat competition … the bill does not abolish competition; it purifies 
and strengthens it.”55 
Another Senator, Democrat Bennet Clark, introduced an amendment that 
affirmed that “nothing in this title shall be construed to compel a change in existing 
satisfactory relationships between the employees and employers of any particular 
plant, firm, or corporation.”56 This amendment would face strong opposition from the 
senators with strong worker rights sympathies and would eventually fail. On the 
other side of the argument were the more conservative senators, who “argued that 
the liberal labor provisions would bring the industrial establishment down in ruins.”57 
Some in the Senate favored what they considered milder legislation in the form of 
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Democratic Senator Hugo Black’s proposed 30-hour work week. Much credit is given 
to Senator Wagner for his arguments about the bill’s protection of collective 
bargaining for labor unions which helped the bill to pass.58  
Eventually, these arguments were rendered too weak to halt the passage of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, as it passed the House of Representatives by a huge 
margin and was adopted by the Senate as well, where it was a much closer margin of 
forty-six to thirty-nine. The vote did not occur on partisan lines, as Republicans La 
Follette, Norris, and Cutting, and Democrats Black, Wheeler, and Costigan all voted 
against the bill. One important negative vote came from Democrat Huey Long, who 
said at the bill’s passage “the Democratic Party dies tonight … we will bury it.”59 
Senator Long, and others, resented the move of the Democratic party led by President 
Roosevelt to a cozier positioning with industry. Long and his allies favored a shift of 
the Democratic party to a platform aligned with socialist ideals.  
At the passage of the National Industry Recovery Act, President Roosevelt 
called it “one of the most important laws that have ever come from Congress.”60 The 
bill itself had two parts. The first part aimed at increasing the purchasing power of 
individuals so that they could consume more, thus feeding into the market.61 It also 
increased the number of restrictions on imports.62 It allowed for some exemptions to 
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the antitrust laws previously passed by the Congress. Much to the ire of conservatives, 
the bill also allowed for collective bargaining.63 The second title created the Public 
Works Administration, which was tasked with putting Americans back to work, 
working on government projects.64 The first Title was intended to last only two years, 
however slightly before that time had elapsed, the Supreme Court ruled it 
unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States.65 
The National Industrial Recovery Act marked one of the various legislative 
accomplishments of Roosevelt’s first new deal, but the recovery was far from over. A 
few years into office, Roosevelt would launch new strategies of recovery and security 
that would just be known as the Second New Deal. One of Roosevelt’s first pieces of 
legislation that he would introduce in the 74th Congress was what he titled the 
‘Economic Security Bill.’ Roosevelt’s administration sent the bill to Congress on 
January 17, 1935, where was introduced by Senator Wagner and Democratic 
Representatives Robert Doughton and David Lewis.66 
By February 20, the bill had received hearings and had been voted out of the 
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Ways and Means Committee. It was in 
the subsequent committee that the bill was renamed the Social Security Act of 1935 at 
the bequest of Democratic Representative Frank Buck.67 During one of the hearings, 
Democratic Senator Thomas Gore asked Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, “Isn't this 
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socialism?”68 This simple question underscores the fears of many of the opponents of 
the Social Security Act. President Roosevelt addressed this concern in one of his 
fireside chats, where he said 
“A few timid people, who fear progress, will try to give you new and 
strange names for what we are doing. … Sometimes they will call it 
'fascism,' sometimes 'communism,' sometimes 'regimentation,' 
sometimes 'socialism.' But, in so doing, they are trying to make very 
complex and theoretical something that is really very simple and very 
practical. ... I believe that what we are doing today is a necessary 
fulfillment of what Americans have always been doing -- a fulfillment 
of old and tested American ideals.”69 
 
He claimed that the legislation’s goal was to reduce a number of dangers that could 
face the country down the road. Roosevelt pleaded with Congress for them to pass 
the Social Security Act expeditiously, and so they would.70 
 On the floor, the Social Security Act met some more substantial friction than 
in committee, mainly from the Republicans. One Republican Congressman is noted 
as saying that “never in the history of the world has any measure been brought here 
so insidiously designed to prevent business recovery, to enslave workers and to 
prevent any possibility of the employers providing work for the people.”71 Another 
claimed that “this bill opens the door and invites the entrance into the political field 
of a power so vast, so powerful as to threaten the integrity of our institutions and to 
pull the pillars of the temple down upon the heads of our descendants.”72  These 
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opponents of the bill all hailed from the state of New York, and were joined by their 
New York colleagues in opposition to the bill. This is an example of how geographical 
alignment often motivated the positions of Congressmen even more than party 
identification. The bill was passed in the House of Representatives by a margin of 
three-hundred and seventy-two to thirty-three after five days of debate and in the 
Senate by a margin of seventy-seven to six, with debate lasting a little more than a 
month.73 The bill then went to conference, where the agreed upon bill passed both 
chambers of Congress. The Social Security Act of 1935 was signed into law by 
President Roosevelt on August 14, 1935. 
The bill passed on such large numbers, due in large part to the support of 
Southern Democrats. Some have argued that Southern Democrats, with their 
powerful positions in the committee structure, altered the legislation to make it more 
palatable to them. One scholar goes as far as to say that 
“Southern politicians, reported one architect of the new law, were 
determined to block any 'entering wedge' for federal interference with 
the handling of the Negro question. Southern employers worried that 
federal benefits would discourage black workers from taking low-
paying jobs in their fields, factories, and kitchens. Thus, neither 
agricultural laborers nor domestic servants—a pool of workers that 
included at least 60 percent of the nation's black population—were 
covered by old-age insurance.”74 
 
Clearly, much Southern opposition was racially motivated. As Linda Gordon 
explains, “Congress was then controlled by wealthy Southern Democrats who were 
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determined to block the possibility of a welfare system allowing blacks freedom to 
reject extremely low-wage and exploitive jobs.”75 
 An alternative perspective to this does exist, however. Larry DeWitt argues 
that it was Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. who convinced Congress to 
remove agriculture and domestic workers from the protection of the Social Security 
Act.76 During his testimony before Congress on the Social Security Act, Morgenthau 
argued “that it would be a difficult problem to collect payments from scattered farm 
and domestic workers, often one to a household or farm, and from the large numbers 
of employees working in establishments with only a few employees.”77 According to 
Morgenthau, it would have been impossible for the Treasury Department to 
implement the Social Security Act if they would have had to include these groups. It 
is for this reason that Dewitt believes members from both sides favored these 
exclusions.78 Practical considerations of feasibility of collecting payments from these 
excluded groups dovetailed with powerful Southern Democrats motivated by race. 
 The passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 marked the first significant 
legislation of the 74th Congress and the first in Roosevelt’s second new deal. It serves 
as the groundwork for the administration of the Social Security program in the United 
States. One of its key functions is to give security to the unemployed as to prevent 
another Great Depression. The constitutionality of the legislation was not certain, 
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however, and was debated during its passage.79 During the legislative process, the 
Supreme Court ruled the first title of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 
unconstitutional, and would soon rule the same of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
in United States v. Butler.80 Some Congressmen were concerned that the Social Security 
Act would be treated the same, but the Attorney General assured them that it was 
distinguishable.81 He would be proven right as the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Company v. Collector of 
Internal Revenue.82 The Social Security Act has endured the test of time even as it 
plagues lawmakers who must continually think of ways to fund it. 
 There is a final event that occurred during the New Deal era which greatly 
affected bipartisanship in Congress. In the summer of 1938, during the primaries for 
Congressional offices, President Roosevelt sought to purge the Democratic party of 
the remaining conservatives. President Roosevelt was angry that these Democrats had 
not gone along with his progressive agenda and stalled his New Deal legislation. 
Among these legislators were Senators Walter George of Georgia, Ed Smith of South 
Carolina, Guy Gillette of Iowa, and Myllard Tydings of Maryland.83 President 
Roosevelt created an elimination committee inside his administration to spearhead 
efforts to support the opponents in each of the primaries.84 But he knew that the 
President could not interfere in Congressional elections, which is why he reasoned 
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that “he did not intend to go into any State in the capacity of President, but as the 
head of the Democratic Party.”85 People at the time adopted the title purge because it 
was a politically charged term that was reminiscent of Stalin’s purges in the Soviet 
Union. 
Roosevelt’s purge proved unsuccessful, as many of his preferred candidates 
lost.86 Journalist Thomas Stokes would comment that Roosevelt’s purge “did not 
liberalize the Democratic Party…only ripped it wider apart.”87 Some go as far to say 
that it “was a reckless, ill-conceived, badly managed strategy that weakened 
Roosevelt’s party leadership and embolden Southern conservative Democrats to 
cooperate more with Republicans in weakening or defeating liberal policy 
proposals.”88 The purge serves as an example of the mindset that would reaper in later 
years that representatives in Congress needed to be ideologically aligned with their 
party. While he may not have been successful of creating a uniform progressive 
Democratic party in Congress, he could ensure the continuation of liberalism in the 
national Party by controlling the national convention.89 
Both the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Social Security Act of 1935, 
passed on strong bipartisan grounds. The National Industrial Recovery Act moved 
through the Senate on a slim margin, but opposition to it was bipartisan and people 
on both sides of the aisle spoke against and for it. While it could be the case that the 
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bipartisanship in both instances could have been provoked by the disastrous 
environment of the Great Depression, many of the Senators voted similarly before the 
events of 1929. Congressmen were more aligned with their geographies, as 
Midwesterners, Southerners, and Northerners were all concerned about different 
aspects of the legislation.  Unlike the case with the Sherman Act, the power to move 
the legislation was with the President and his allies. Even though he exerted great 
influence over the Congress in pushing his policy, he noticed that it was not infinite, 
thus his attempt to purge the Democratic party ended in failure. The New Deal era 
serves as an example of how legislation in Congress transcended the bounds of 
partisan politics, where it would battle on a more regional field. Those regional 
boundaries would become more important, however, in later years. 
  
 33 
Chapter Three: A Battle for Civil Rights 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the 
Social Security Act of 1935, each represents legislation aimed at controlling the beast 
that is the economy. In the mid-1960s, Congress had to deal with a completely 
different beast as it was faced with the task of integrating America.  Since the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson that justified “separate but equal,” segregation had 
spread to nearly every aspect of American life. People were treated differently in 
schools, government services, and businesses based solely on the color of their skin. 
Beginning with Roosevelt, much of the civil rights action that had taken place 
nationally, occurred with executive action alone.90 One such action was Executive 
Order 8802, which prohibited discrimination based on race in all areas of the federal 
defense industry.91 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
to desegregate schools and its resulting backlash and protests, it was clear that 
Congress needed to act with legislation to ensure uniform civil rights for all 
Americans. 
Two years into his administration, President John F. Kennedy sent a message 
to Congress in which he would say, 
“the [black] baby born in America today ... has about one-half as much 
chance of completing high school as a white baby born in the same place 
on the same day—one-third as much chance of completing college—
one-third as much chance of becoming a professional man—twice as 
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much chance of becoming unemployed—... a life expectancy which is 
seven years less—and the prospects of earning only half as much."92 
 
Kennedy’s administration then sent a bill to Congress, which outlined his moderate 
goals, for their consideration by the summer of that year. Immediately, proponents of 
the bill knew that they would face challenges in the more conservative House 
Judiciary Committee, as well as the Rules Committee.93 The bill was debated for a 
couple months in a House Judiciary Subcommittee, which gave it time to begin 
earning bipartisan support.  
Many Congressmen believed that the bill did not go far enough in securing the 
rights of African Americans. Emboldened by the March on Washington, House 
Judiciary Committee Chairmen Democrat Emanuel Celler revealed at a press 
conference that the subcommittee had voted through “a very strong bill,” that not 
only included the President’s proposal, but also further measures that some 
progressives were pushing for.94 During all of the committee debates, House 
leadership was trying to do whatever was possible to sway enough Republicans to 
their side to offset the nearly one hundred Southern Democrats who would surely 
vote against the bill.95 The full Judiciary Committee would report the bill to the full 
Congress, but only after a compromised version was presented, spearheaded by both 
the Republican Ranking Member William McCulloch and Minority Leader Charles 
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Halleck.96 With the news that President Kennedy had been assassinated, the bill was 
paused in the Rules Committee. 
 Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency after Kennedy’s assassination and 
kept civil rights action on the forefront of his agenda. In his first address to Congress, 
he said that “no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President 
Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the Civil Rights bill for which 
he fought so long."97 Unfortunately, Rules Committee Chairman, Southerner Howard 
Smith was not inclined to pass the bill through his committee, so that it could see a 
vote of the full House.98 At the beginning of the following year, Speaker John 
McCormack and Majority Leader Carl Albert forced the bill through the Rules 
Committee. After only a couple of days of debate on the floor, the bill passed the 
House of Representatives two hundred ninety to one hundred thirty, with many 
Southern Democrats voting in opposition.99 The Southern Democrats in the House 
realized early in the debate that they had been defeated, therefore they did not protest 
much. 
 The bill then moved to the Senate, where Democratic Senate Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield successfully moved it to the Senate Calendar, avoiding the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, where it would have surely died at the hands of Chairman 
James Eastland from Mississippi.100 The fight was far from over, however, as Southern 
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Democrats and their allies were preparing to filibuster the bill to its death. The 
proponents of the bill, led by Republican Thomas Kuchel and Democrat Hubert 
Humphrey, the Senate whips, would lead an organized effort to defeat the 
filibuster.101 They were largely successful at keeping their members together and 
united, and preventing a cloture motion from happening too soon. Organized 
campaigns to rally support behind civil rights legislation kept public support 
energizing Senators to continue their fight. The proponents were constantly looking 
for new allies to join them in hopes of beating the necessary sixty votes to end cloture. 
Through carful negotiations and some minor changes to the bill, Senator Humphrey 
would gain the support of Republican Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen.102 
Senator Dirksen’s support was important as it brought twenty-five Republican votes 
in line to vote for the bill.  
On the opponents’ side, rhetoric was the tool of choice to defeat the bill. 
Democrat Richard Russell gave a floor speech in which he said, “we will resist to the 
bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about 
social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our [Southern] 
states."103 Southern Democrats and their allies would surely do just that with countless 
hours of talk and constant quorum calls. It seemed as though the filibuster would last 
forever. Majority Leader Mansfield was determined to ensure he had two-thirds of 
the Senators backing him before he called for cloture, so he would not be forced to 
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compromise if the cloture vote failed. Proponents of the bill were having a difficult 
time rounding up the votes needed until a group of clergy from various faiths began 
demonstrations at the Lincoln Memorial. Of the event, Senator Humphrey said, “the 
secret of passing the bill is the prayer groups … just wait until [senators] start hearing 
from the church people.”104 The Senate whips then reached the necessary total of 
votes. Shortly before the debate ended, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia, delivered a speech in opposition to the bill that lasted 14 hours.105 After a 
triad of amendments were given votes to quell Senator Bourke Hickenlooper and 
other Midwestern Republicans, a vote for cloture came to the floor.106 Speaking for 
reaching cloture, Minority Leader Dirksen said that “there is another reason why we 
dare not temporize with the issue which is before us. It is essentially moral in 
character. It must be resolved. It will not go away. Its time has come."107 With all 
hands-on-deck, proponents of the bill met the two-thirds majority requirement and 
sent the bill for a final vote. 
Senate Majority Leader Humphrey gave the first speech in formal debate, in 
which he said, 
“We are participants in one of the most crucial eras in the long and 
proud history of the United States and, yes, in mankind’s struggle for 
justice and freedom which has gone forward since the dawn of history. 
If freedom becomes a full reality in America, we can dare to believe that 
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it will become a reality everywhere. If freedom fails here in America, the 
land of the free—what hope can we have for it surviving elsewhere?”108 
 
For Humphrey and many others, it was a momentous occasion to be able to reach 
formal debate on civil rights legislation as it had never been possible to reach cloture 
before. Humphrey’s goal in his eloquent prose was to win over Minority Leader 
Dirksen and his Republicans, who had voted for the cloture motion, to once again 
vote for the final passage of the Civil Rights Act.109 
Just as there was bipartisan support for the bill, there was also bipartisan 
opposition to the bill. During a speech on the Senate floor, Republican Barry 
Goldwater “I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort, and I believe that 
though the problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help — but not 
law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the 
Constitution and which require for their effective execution the creation of a police 
state.... I shall vote 'no' on this bill."110 Republicans like Goldwater wanted to make it 
clear that their opposition to the bill stemmed from their belief that Congress did not 
have the constitutional authority based on the Commerce Clause to enact such laws, 
and not from a racist ideology. Southern Democrats were less covert in their 
opposition, which more often than not stemmed from the very racist ideology that 
Republicans were trying to avoid. Strom Thurmond, a Democratic Senator from South 
Carolina said that “Passage of this bill will visit the heel of oppression on all the 
people, vitiate their constitutional shield against tyranny, and materially hasten the 
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destruction of the best design for self-government yet devised by the minds of 
men."111 Southern Democrats often veiled their motives behind rhetorical prose 
rooted in the theme of liberty. Rather than being concerned about individual liberty, 
Southern Democrats were seeking liberty for the state from federal interference. This 
defense of liberty differed from the sentiments of Republicans Senators such as 
Goldwater who cared about maintaining constitutional limits on Congress’ power.  
Bipartisanship was also present for the proponents of the bill. For example, 
Democrats Paul Douglas and Edmond Muskie, and Republicans Kenneth Keating and 
Clifford Case were present for over one hundred votes that occurred in the ten days 
of debate, always voting for civil rights.112 Their bipartisanship would pay off as the 
bill passed the Senate on June 19th, with a vote of seventy-three to twenty-seven.113 All 
seventeen Southern Democrats voted in the negative where they were joined by six 
Republicans and a couple stray Democrats.114 The Senate bill passed the House the 
following month, with Rules Committee Chairmen Smith being one of the only 
negative votes for the bill. At the passage of the bill in the House, Georgian freshman 
Representative Charles Weltner said, “I shall add my voice to those who seek 
reasoned and conciliatory adjustment to a new reality.”115 
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President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law only a 
couple of hours after the House had their final vote on July 2, 1964.116 Just after signing 
the law, Johnson gave a speech in which he said, 
“This Civil Rights Act is a challenge to all of us to go to work in our 
communities and our states, in our homes and in our hearts, to eliminate 
the last vestiges of injustice in our beloved country. So tonight I urge 
every public official, every religious leader, every business and 
professional man, every working man, every housewife — I urge every 
American — to join in this effort to bring justice and hope to all our 
people, and to bring peace to our land.”117 
 
The President captured the sentiment of the nation in these phrases. Outside of the 
racist ideologies of the minority of Americans, in particular, those in the South, the 
majority of people were overjoyed at the signing of such monumental legislation. 
 The Civil Rights Act accomplished three main goals. First, it protected the 
voting rights of all people. Second, it rejected discrimination of any form in any public 
place or places that engaged the public. Finally, it extended the protection of the equal 
employment opportunities to everyone.118 During Reconstruction, similar legislation 
was proposed, only to be struck down by the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights 
Cases.119 A challenge to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, would come almost immediately 
after the bill became law when Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States was argued 
before the Court. This time, however, the Supreme Court upheld the Civil Rights Act, 
with the power of enforcement in the private sector coming from the Commerce 
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Clause.120 Similar rulings were made in Katzenbach v. McClung and Alexander v. Holmes 
County Board of Education. 
 While the passage of the Civil Rights Act is significant, it predicts and certainly 
prompts a change in the makeup of the electorate. Post-Civil War, African Americans 
supported the Republican Party. The south remained loyally Democratic. But this 
started to change after the Great Depression. Things began to change when President 
Roosevelt saw the African American voter block as a key for the Democratic Party’s 
continued success. He drew them in with his economic policies, and in true 
progressive fashion, he would push the Democratic party towards civil rights. This 
would only alienate the Southern Democratic Congressmen. These tensions were 
exacerbated during the Civil Rights Act debates. 
 President Johnson recognized the danger for his party to be the one 
spearheading the civil rights campaign. In response to a prediction that Southern 
Democrats would leave the party, Johnson said, “I know the risks are great and it 
might cost us the South, but those sort of states may be lost anyway.”121 The Civil 
Rights Act did indeed drive out many Southern Democrats from the Democratic 
party, removing the question of regional ideologies above party ideology.  Outspoken 
Senator Strong Thurmond of South Carolina was one of the most high-profile officials 
to switch to the Republican side. In response, Republican Senator Karl Mundt said, 
“Southern Democrats and rural Republicans in this country have much in common 
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… we need to do some political engineering so we can work and vote together.”122 
Even though Republicans gained seats in the Democratic South, Democrats arguably 
won the most as the percentage of Americans identifying as Democratic jumped seven 
percent in the election of 1964.123 Regardless of the immediate outcome, the events of 
1964 did something more important as well. For much of the 20th century, Republicans 
and Democrats were very similar on many top issues, but 1964 marked a dramatic 
polarization of parties, that would change the political landscape of the country.124 
The passage of the Civil Rights Act demonstrates a very important change in 
the bipartisanship in Congress. No longer was it the case that a bill could sail through 
Congress. Accommodations had to made to attract coalitions of Senators to vote for 
bills. This gave more responsibility and power to the hands of congressional whips, 
who are tasked with securing votes for a given piece of legislation. With the Civil 
Rights Act, there were Republicans and Democrats who supported it, and there were 
those who did not, making both the opposition and support bipartisan. Unlike the 
New Deal legislation, the President did not exert as much control over the process for 
the flow of the legislation through Congress. The power at this point was in the hands 
of the Majority and Minority Leaders, who could route legislation around committees 
and rally their members to vote their way. It is also important to note the power of the 
people. When the public, sometimes led by Civil Rights leaders such as Martin Luther 
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King, Jr. or by the clergy, put pressure on Congressmen, they reacted. This is more 





The realignment that occurred after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 
marks the beginning of the party ideological alignment in the United States Congress. 
Other events over the course of the past few decades would further strengthen party 
identification in Congress.  After nearly forty years as the minority party in the House 
of Representatives, Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich and Texas Congressman 
Dick Amey launched a national campaign to elect Republicans and gain the majority. 
Their campaign was focused on the implementation of their ‘Contract with 
America’.125 The ‘Contract with America’ was a detailed set of legislative goals that 
Republicans promised to enact if they became the majority. From an electoral 
standpoint, the ‘Contract with America’ was a campaigning success, ensuring the 
election of fifty-four new House members, and nine new Senators.126 The ‘Contract 
with America’ is different than other electoral stunts, as the new majority was 
committed to seeing its goals through. A New York Times reporter wrote, “perhaps not 
since the start of the New Deal, to which many of the programs now under attack can 
trace their origins, has Congress moved with such speed on so many fronts.”127 The 
‘Contract with America’ is not merely a legislative agenda, but represents the 
unification of the majority party under a uniform political ideology. 
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Over the next fourteen years, Democrats would regain their strength in the 
Congress, until they reached their peak in 2008. By 2008, Democrats had a huge 
margin in the House and a filibuster proof margin in the Senate. With the events 
surrounding the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the political landscape was yet 
again shifting. The midterm elections of 2010 saw the rise of the Tea Party movement. 
The Tea Party candidates were opposed to a larger federal government, and were 
concerned about the increasing national debt. They were ideologically more 
conservative than the Republicans already in Congress, but would caucus with them 
once in Congress. While not in the margins that they were hoping for, Tea Party 
candidates won five Senate seats and forty House seats in the elections of 2010.128 
Their size within Congress forced the Republican party to shift to the right, for them 
to meet legislative goals that Democrats refused to budge on. This shift further 
increased the partisan divide between the two sides of Congress. 
Today, both parties refuse to work together on most high-attention legislation 
and any bipartisanship that occurs in Congress is weak, at best. So, how did we get 
here? When the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed through Congress, the legislation 
was passed on bipartisan grounds. Republicans and Democrats certainly did not 
agree on how to deal with trusts, but leaders in Congress produced a bill that was 
mild and palatable to both sides. Likewise, when the New Deal legislation came 
before Congress, President Roosevelt forced compromise to create legislation that 
both sides could agree on. Roosevelt’s failed actions toward purging the Democratic 
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Party, would preempt the ideological tensions that would happen in the Democratic 
Party in the latter half of the century. By the time of the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act, these tensions were boiling over. Ideological differences prevented many 
Congressmen from supporting the legislation. The years following the passage would 
see the ideological separation of the two parties in Congress. This ideological gap 
would only grow through the events and elections of recent years. 
An important aspect of this narrative is the role of public opinion. The public 
was unified on the distrust of the trusts, and so all Congressmen had to demonstrate 
that they were doing something in order to gain votes. After the Great Depression, all 
average Americans were hurting, therefore it was easy for Congressmen to support 
recovery efforts. The Civil Rights Act demonstrated a change in public opinion. While 
many in the South supported their Congressmen’s opposition to the bill, others all 
throughout the country were energized with support over it. For the first time, these 
supporters applied such large amounts of political pressure on their Congressmen, 
through rallies, marches, and protests, that their Congressmen were forced to 
respond. This change could have occurred because of the easier access to news and 
protests. Today, as partisanship in Congress has increased, so too has that access to 
public officials and the news. Other factors that could have contributed to the 
bipartisan efforts of the New Deal era include the role of the President, as President 
Roosevelt greatly influenced the passage of legislation in the wake of the Great 
Depression. 
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Congress’ current lack of bipartisanship has slowed the movement of 
significant legislation to a halt. I would argue that there are two things that can be 
done to significantly increase the amount of bipartisanship. Power needs to be given 
back to committee chairs to enable them to craft legislation that works for both sides. 
At the same time, the concept of compromise needs to be understood by all 
Congressmen, where both sides leave satisfied and disappointed. Second, political 
parties need to become more reserved in congressional races. Electing representatives 
who subscribe to a definite, all-encompassing platform removes the ability of subject 
and regional coalitions, which greatly aids to bipartisanship. An example of a current 
bipartisan group in Congress, is a group of Congressmen, both Democrats and 
Republicans, who are joined together over their faiths.129 While this coalition probably 
will not yield any significant legislative power, it serves as an example of the types of 
bipartisan groups that could be formed if representatives were not forced to uphold 
the comprehensive party platform. Accomplishing these things will be difficult and 
may not even be possible, however if the country is going to heal from its partisan 
wounds then Congress is going to have to find some way to become more bipartisan. 
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